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1 Introduction
More and more aspects of our daily life depend heavily on large-scale infrastruc-
tural systems, think of rail and road networks, but also about telecommunication
networks (internet, wired and wireless telephony). Many governments have recently
issued reports on the importance (and vulnerability) of their so-called critical infras-
tructures, e.g., [1,2,3]; an overview can be found in [7]. Over the last few years, the
infrastructure systems and networks that provide gas, water and electricity have
become much more “ICT-based”, implying that their well-operation is becoming
dependent on the correct operation of the supporting ICT. And although the em-
bedded ICT does provide more functionality, it is also often a source of failures, or
the victim of attacks. Nevertheless, it is essential for all these critical infrastructural
systems to survive catastrophic events. In this paper we address approaches towards
so-called “survivability evaluation” of infrastructural systems; our focus thereby lies
on water, gas and electricity infrastructures, infrastructures that used to be run by
municipalities, but now are mostly run by large internationally operating companies.
We note here that the concept of survivability is not restricted to just this class
of infrastructural systems. It is also known for military devices, for example, air-
craft combat survivability, and even in agriculture [39]. The literature is abundant
with diﬀerent deﬁnitions of survivability. For an overview see for example [33,41].
Distinct deﬁnitions stress diﬀerent aspects of survivability, be it the detection of
faults, the defence against attacks or the recovery from various types of disasters.
We will focus on the behaviour of a system after a disaster has occurred. Note that
we do not introduce a new deﬁnition of survivability but state a slightly generalised
version of the one in [19]; it reﬂects an intuitively appealing view on survivability
of systems but is therefore also quite informal:
Survivability is the ability of a system to recover predeﬁned service levels in a
timely manner after the occurrence of disasters.
A disaster might be any kind of severe disturbance of the infrastructural system, for
example, a power breakdown, a complete or partial cut of communication lines, a
ﬂood, heavy rain or a thunderstorm. The possible causes are manifold and include
purposeful attacks as well as natural disasters like earthquakes or thunderstorms.
A system is survivable if it includes mechanisms to return to normal service
within an acceptable time even though a disaster occurred. What kind of mech-
anisms are used and how they are implemented is not part of the survivability
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deﬁnition. One possible mechanism to achieve survivability is fault tolerance or any
other form of redundancy [51].
The above deﬁnition of survivability does not give at all a precise recipe how to
decide whether a system is survivable or not. To overcome this, many approaches
have been followed in the literature for the quantitative determination of survivabil-
ity [38,40,41,45,63]. Most of them are model-based and suggest some measure on
the system (model) behaviour and study its evolution after the occurrence of a dis-
aster. It, thus, is the deliberate decision of the person performing the survivability
evaluation to choose an appropriate measure.
Note that the deﬁnition of survivability in essence addresses the evolution of
the system of interest after the occurrence of a disaster. This implies that the
process leading to a disaster, does not have to be included in the evaluation of
the survivability. This is actually very favourable, as the exact occurrence process
and probabilities are mostly very diﬃcult to establish. In this context, we speak
of so-called GOOD models for survivability, for Given the Occurrence Of Disasters
[63]. In contrast, models in which the disaster occurrence is explicitly modelled, are
called ROOD models, for Random Occurrence Of Disasters.
What is typical for the approaches 11 presented in this paper, is that the appli-
cation ﬁeld requires some form of hybrid model, taking into account discrete state
components (e.g., for the up/down state of various components, or their mode of
operation), continuous state components (e.g., for the physical issues playing a role),
in combination with both deterministic (e.g., ﬁxed time-outs or deterministic sys-
tem evolution) and stochastic behaviour (e.g., for restoration or repair actives with
random length). This combination makes analytical approaches very challenging,
however, there is a clear need for these, as purely simulation-based approaches are
very costly, sometimes even overly costly, to use in practice. In the remaining part
of the paper, we give a brief introduction into recent approaches on survivability
evaluation of infrastructures for smart water, gas and electricity networks.
The three approaches have quite a lot in common, however, also have remark-
able diﬀerences. Two of them (that for gas and electricity) are based on a form of
behavioural decomposition [56] in which the failure (or disaster) handling process
is modelled separately from the performance of the system, through a combination
of a stochastic process describing the failure handling mechanism and steady-state
performance measures of interest, much the same as done in performability evalu-
ation using Markov-reward models [28]. In contrast, in the approach taken for the
water system is truly hybrid, in that the failure handling process and the water
transportation and storage are combined in a single integrated model.
11Since this paper has an overview character, more details and mathematical background on these ap-
proaches can be found in other (cited) papers.
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2 Water infrastructure
2.1 Water
Water infrastructures include the production and distribution of drinking water, as
well as the collection and cleaning of sewage water. The main goal of drink water
companies is the reliable supply of high quality water, whereas sewage facilities have
to guarantee that a predeﬁned maximum amount of water can be taken from the
community sewage system and be cleaned and released with acceptable quality.
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Analysis) systems are used to remotely
manage treatment and distribution facilities in all phases of operation [52]. They are
used for real-time monitoring and control of the substance (water) quality, optimis-
ing pumps, maintaining reservoir levels, managing distribution systems pressures,
detection of leakages and to ensure the security of facilities. Improperly managed
water networks can result in increased cost and insuﬃcient supply of drinking wa-
ter. Currently, water cleaning facilities are migrating towards unmanned operation,
as human operation can not be guaranteed due to labor laws. The trend towards
unmanned operation requires even more dependable and survivable systems.
2.2 Modelling approaches
To make the above more concrete, we now focus wastewater-management systems.
Such systems clean water in several chemical and physical cleaning steps, before
it is released. A suitable modelling formalism for such systems needs to take into
account continuous (water tanks, pumps, etc.) and discrete (the setting of valves,
the state of the SCADA system, etc.) quantities, as well as random events (fail-
ure occurrences, repair times, etc.). So-called stochastic hybrid models (SHMs)
combine discrete and continuous variables with stochastics, hence, allow to model
water treatment facilities in a natural way. However, the water treatment plants
we want to consider are by far too large for state-of-the-art approaches that feature
general SHMs. Several formalisms supporting SHMs have been deﬁned [18,27,31],
where each of them is suitable only in some very speciﬁc domain, and suﬀers from
limitations that prevent it from being used in other applications.
Water management systems are characterised by deterministic ﬂuid transporta-
tion, however, with rates that change according to a stochastic process. Hence,
Fluid Stochastic Petri Nets (FSPNs) [27,31] and Piece-wise Deterministic Markov
Processes (PDMPs) [18] appear to be suitable. However, the memory of continuous
variables in PDMPs is lost upon stochastic transitions. Hence, they are not suitable
to model the physical behaviour of ﬂuid critical infrastructures. First and second
order Fluid stochastic Petri nets (FSPNs), cf.[27,61], have a sound mathematical
basis allowing for a completely formalised characterisation of the state-evolution in
terms of diﬀerential equations. However, such equations can be solved only when
there are at most one or two continuous variables. Simulation is the only available
alternative when considering larger models [14,26].
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2.3 Hybrid Petri-nets with General one-shot Transitions
To tackle the issue of scalability, a new approach based on Hybrid Petri nets [17]
has recently been proposed, where the deterministic evolution is separated from
the stochastic evolution of the system [25], by exploiting the quasi-deterministic be-
haviour of the system under study, given that failure and repair events are stochastic.
Therefore, there are relatively few stochastic transitions, which allows for separating
the deterministic from the stochastic evolution of the system, using a conditioning-
deconditioning argument. This will speed up the reachability analysis and will allow
for a large number of continuous variables in the model, as opposed to previous ap-
proaches.
The Hybrid Petri Net formalism with General one-shot transitions (HPNG) as
proposed in [25] is speciﬁcally tailored towards ﬂuid critical infrastructures. It allows
for an arbitrary number of continuous variables (“tanks”) that can be connected via
ﬂuid transitions (“pumps”). These transitions can be controlled by discrete places
that can be connected via deterministic and generally distributed transitions; these
can be used to model the ICT part of the system. Generally distributed transitions
must respect the constraint that they can ﬁre only once during the evolution of the
model: for this reason we call them one-shot transitions. They can be used well to
model one-time disasters, or repairs.
[24] introduces a new and eﬃcient algorithm that maps the underlying state-
space onto a plane for all possible ﬁring times of the general transition s and for
all possible system times t. The key idea of the proposed method is that instead
of dealing with inﬁnitely many points in the so-called t− s plane, we can partition
the state space into several regions, such that all points inside one region are asso-
ciated with the same system state. To compute the probability to be in a speciﬁc
system state at time τ , it suﬃces to ﬁnd all regions intersecting the line t = τ and
decondition the ﬁring time over the intersections.
To compute more complex measures of interest over time, the so-called Stochas-
tic Time Logic (STL) has been proposed in [23], together with eﬃcient model check-
ing procedures that recursively traverse the underlying state space of the hybrid
Petri net model. STL allows to formulate intricate state-based and time-bounded-
until-based properties; the notion of survivability can easily be expressed using the
until operator. Even though the current analysis approach is limited to a single
general one-shot transition, it has been shown in [22] that one can eﬀectively model
and analyse a real sewage treatment facility, as will be shown next.
2.4 Case study
Waste water treatment facilities clean sewage water from households and industry in
several cleaning steps. Such facilities are dimensioned to accommodate a maximum
intake. However, in the case of very bad weather conditions or failures of system
components the system might not suﬃce to accommodate all waste water. We show
the model of a real waste water treatment facility, situated in the city of Enschede,
the Netherlands, as HPNG and analyse under which circumstances the existing
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Fig. 1. The simpliﬁed HPnG model of the sewage system in the city of Enschede
infrastructure will overﬂow.
Figure 1 models the various stages of the sewage treatment process in a simpliﬁed
manner. We are mainly interested in the capacity of each phase and the average
amount of time the waste water stays in the diﬀerent phases. We, however, do not
aim at modelling the physical, chemical and biological processes in detail. Then,
for a given failure of the system (at a certain time), we analyse the survivability
of the system for changing weather conditions. Fixing the failure to a speciﬁc
time of the day results in a so-called “Given the Occurrence Of Disaster” (GOOD)
model, allows us to model the repair of the system with the single general one-shot
transition. Since the evaluation method at hand is so quick, it is easily possible to
parametrize the failure time and hence analyse the system thoroughly.
The capacity of the community sewerage system is modelled by an overﬂow place
denoted Pc (the leftmost “box” in Figure 1), of which the input rate may diﬀer,
depending on the weather conditions. From this tank the water is pumped into the
treatment facility with a maximum rate 12 (transition Tz); in case the input exceeds
the capacity of the place and the intake of the treatment facility, waste water ﬂows
into place Po which models the amount of water in the streets. The primary stage
of the sewage treatment consists of two phases, namely the sand interceptor and the
primary sedimentation tank. The sand interceptor is responsible for ﬁltering solids
like sand from the water. After that, the sewage ﬂows into a large tank, which
is used to settle the sludge, while the lighter material rises to the surface and is
removed, and the remaining water overﬂows. In the model the sand interceptor is
abstracted by the pump Tz, and the primary sedimentation tank is modelled by the
overﬂow place Pps.
A sedimentation tank physically separates suspended solids from water using
gravity [5]. While the dirt settles at the ground, cleaned water is forwarded to the
second cleaning stage. This stage consists of several phases for removing chemical
and biological contaminations, modelled by a sequence of continuous transitions and
places, before a secondary sedimentation tank separates the biological material from
the now environment friendly sewage water, that can safely be disposed to surface
water. The second sedimentation tank is modelled by overﬂow place Pss. The sludge
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that settles at the primary and secondary sedimentation tank is accumulated and
forwarded to the sludge treatment stage. There it is thickened to reduce its volume
for easier oﬀ-site transport. The sludge from the primary tank is pumped out and
forwarded to the fresh sludge thickener. This is also modelled by an overﬂow place,
denoted Pft. Sludge is pumped out of the place with a small rate and discharged to
the digestion tank which is considered a very large tank. The overﬂow is directed to
the ﬁltrate basement. The same procedure is repeated for the accumulated sludge
in the second sedimentation tank.
We now consider a failure in the sand interceptor, Tz, modelled by the determin-
istic transition Tf , ﬁring at deterministic time α (which again could be parametrized
for any value). After the occurrence of a failure, a repair crew will repair the pump,
which takes, on average 2 hours (but that actually follows an exponential distri-
bution). For this case we now investigate the following survivability property Φ
(expressed in the logic STL):
Φ = (xPo < 0.01) U [α,α+30] (mPr = 1),(1)
where, mPr = 1, means that the sand interceptor pump is repaired. This equation
expresses the probability that the overﬂow tank Po will have a very low level, that is,
there is no overﬂow, during the 30 hours following the failure, or until it is repaired,
whichever comes ﬁrst. Here, we have chosen the time bound [α, α + 30] for the
Until operator, since the pump is supposed to be repaired within 30 hours after its
failure. The above formula (1) is typical for a wide variety of survivability measures
of interest. The ﬁrst term, before the Until operator is called the safety condition,
whereas the one after the Until operator is called therecovery condition.
For this scenario, we consider two parameters, the time of failure and the intake
rate. The result is shown in Figure 2. On the x-axis the overall intake rate (leftmost
transition) is varied from 6 to 13, and the y-axis represents diﬀerent failure occur-
rence times, from α = 30 minutes (0.5 hours) to α = 5 hours (after model start). As
expected, for larger intake rates, the probability for Φ to hold decreases. However,
it is interesting that for a late occurrence of the failure, the probability is lower,
especially for high intake rates. The reason for this is that the eﬀective capacity of
the system is equal to the sum of the cleaning street rate (rate 4), and the fresh
sludge thickener pump rate (rate 1.25), that is, 5.25 in total. Initially, the buﬀer Pc
is fully ﬁlled (capacity 20). Therefore, the buﬀer is ﬁlling up for intake rates greater
than 5.25, hence, a late failure will cause a quicker violation of the safety condition.
For intake rates smaller than 5.25, the buﬀer Pc is actually emptied. On the other
hand, when failures take place early, we have a non-zero survivability probability,
even for high intake rates.
2.5 Conclusions
The case study clearly shows the strength of HPNGs in both modelling capabilities
and eﬃciency of computations, for the application ﬁeld of critical water infrastruc-
tures, even with the current restriction to a single general one-shot transition. Using
the underlying stochastic time diagram and the new algorithms for model checking
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Fig. 2. Probability of holding Φ by parametrizing two factors: intake rate (x-axis) and failure time (y-axis).
the logic STL, it is possible to analyse the survivability of the system very quickly,
so that full parametric studies can easily be performed.
3 Gas infrastructure
3.1 Gas
Long-range gas transportation is performed through transmission networks (publicly-
owned in some countries), which operate at high-pressure and usually feature redun-
dancy and storage capacity (pipeline, underground, liqueﬁed natural gas) to make
shortage a very unlikely event. Gas delivery to customers is mostly achieved by
distribution networks (owned by municipalities or private investors), which operate
at lower pressure due to safety issues and leakage control.
In the past, gas transmission, distribution, and retail were usually performed
by a single “vertical” company. Nowadays, the liberalised regulation has produced
a number of independent companies which manage customer service but have no
role in network operation. Hence, the new role of a gas network operator includes
the calculation and publication of technical and available capacity, the allocation of
capacity rights, and the contractual and physical congestion management.
Survivability evaluation has been less investigated for gas networks compared
to electric and telecommunication network systems. However, recently, the subject
is receiving increased attention due to competitive challenges raised by demand-
response control applications, smart monitoring and actuation devices, novel indus-
trial organisation of utilities, and an emphasis on homeland security and service-
ability [4].
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3.2 Modelling approaches
Most of the literature on the analysis of gas networks focuses on the ﬂuid-dynamics
perspective, mainly oriented to assess ﬂow rates and pressures across network ele-
ments [30,16,49]. Optimisation of operations has been addressed in various ways,
notably to favour eﬃcient integration within multi-carrier systems combining pro-
visioning of electric and gas power [48,37,34,43]. Stochastic modelling has been
applied in [9] to consider diﬀerent rates of leakage that may occur in a pipe fault
and thus predict the impact on pressures and ﬂow rates, supporting the planning of
appropriate actions to mitigate risks. In [54], ﬂuid-dynamic analysis of a section of
a real gas network is repeated for diﬀerent conﬁgurations of demand, thus reﬂecting
the statistics of usage at diﬀerent hours of the day and in diﬀerent seasons. The
eﬀects of sequential restoration and constrained network capacity are considered in
[29] to support reliability assessment by deriving average measures of interruption
rate and outage time experienced by end-users, exemplifying the approach on a
small-sized gas network.
3.3 An approach for derivation of transient survivability metrics
The recently proposed approach in [11] addresses quantitative evaluation of the
transient behaviour of a gas distribution networks after the failure of a network
element, i.e., again addressing a so-called GOOD model. Notice that the HPNG
model cannot directly be used in the context of gas networks; the HPNG model
does only address the ﬂuid volume, and (piecewise) constant pump rates; for gas
networks, next to the volume also the pressure should betaken into account. Based
on pressure, also the pumps speeds can change. Temperature is taken to be constant.
Overall, a more advanced modelling and analysis approach is needed for modelling
gas distribution networks.
As a relevant assumption, changes of the operating conditions of the network
due to daily and seasonal demand variations or demand-response mechanisms are
considered independent of the actions taken in reaction to a component failure.
This permits a decoupling of the ﬂuid dynamic behaviour of gas from the stochastic
temporal behaviour of recovery actions, yielding two distinct models, while allow-
ing their separate analyses to provide feedback to each other (“co-modelling”). On
the one hand, the ﬂuid dynamics model follows a relatively conventional graph-
theoretical representation of the network topology, supporting well-known tech-
niques for the evaluation of pressures and ﬂow rates under a given conﬁguration
of components and parameters. On the other hand, the failure management model
provides a representation of the diﬀerent functional behaviours that may occur when
a network component fails.
The ﬂuid dynamic analysis consists of solving a system of non-linear equations
that describes the gas behaviour across the network in terms of pressures at nodes
and mass ﬂow rates in pipes. This is performed through an iterative procedure
based on the Newton-Raphson method, cf. [15]. Setting up and solving such system
of equations has a complexity of O(N+M) and O(N3), respectively, where N is the
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number of nodes and M is the number of pipes. The number of sectioning valves
does not aﬀect ﬂuid dynamic analysis. The failure management and recovery process
model is deﬁned as a so-called stochastic Time Petri Net (sTPN) [57] extended
with enabling and ﬂush functions [55] (see Figure 3, lower part), which augment
the modelling convenience without changing the model expressivity nor disrupting
the subsequent analysis. As shown in Figure 3 (upper part), the model structure
can be visualised using the UML activity diagram of recovery actions and turns
out to be independent of the network topology, which makes the model general and
almost guarantees a constant level of complexity of stochastic analysis. In contrast,
stochastic distributions associated with temporal parameters of the model depend
on the speciﬁc network under analysis, notably on the failure localisation and the
consequent pressure regulation within the network.
The failure management and recovery process model describes the successive
steps to be taken to recover from a disaster (or failure), in Figure 3 (lower part)
visualised as an sTPN. This model may include concurrently enabled transitions
with non-exponential distributions (possibly with bounded support), which goes
well beyond the limits of the so-called enabling restriction and motivates the use
of the solution technique proposed in [32] to perform transient stochastic analysis.
The analysis method yields the transient probability of each logical state of the
model, which actually corresponds to a speciﬁc operating condition of the network.
The complexity of the analysis largely depends on the number of concurrent timers
and on the length of paths between subsequent regenerations. As the structure
of the survivability model is independent of the network topology, also the com-
plexity of stochastic analysis turns out to be independent of the network topology.
Subsequently, these probabilities are aggregated on the basis of the results of ﬂuid
dynamic analysis, which is in fact repeated under diﬀerent boundary conditions to
assess the service level experienced by each load node in each operating condition
of the network, i.e., after each step of the failure management and recovery pro-
cess that either changes the network topology or the pressure at the supply node.
Hence, for each tangible state in the failure management and recovery process, a
ﬂuid dynamic analysis has to be performed; the results of these are combined with
the transient state probabilities, in much the same way as done for performabil-
ity evaluation using Markov-reward models [28]. This ﬁnally allows us to derive
transient and average availability measures for end-users.
3.4 Case study
To provide a proof of concept of the overall methodology, the approach has been
applied on a small-sized network taken from the literature and shown in Figure 4(a)
[29]. The network is made of a supply node, four load nodes (marked as A through
D) and nine pipes (numbered from 4 to 12). The gas is provided by the supply node,
while the sectioning valve belonging to pipe 9 is kept closed in ordinary operating
conditions. According to this, the gas is supplied radially, so that load nodes A and
B are served by pipes 4 and 6, and 4, 7 and 8, respectively (the “upper branch”),
while load nodes C and D are served by pipes 5, 11 and 12, and 5 and 10, respectively
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(the “lower branch”). Without loss of generality, we now focus on failures of pipe
5, as failures of pipes belonging to the so-called network ring leave more load nodes
not served than failures of radial pipes. Table 1 illustrates the results of ﬂuid
dynamic analysis, whereas Figures 4(b,c,d) show the transient metrics derived for
each end-user. Although not reported here, the stochastic analysis also supports
the derivation of the average outage time experienced by load nodes after a pipe
failure. If failure statistics are known, such average availability measures could also
be derived over a longer period of time.
failure management step online served nodes online not served nodes oﬄine nodes
automated detection A,B - C,D
network reconﬁguration - A,B,C,D -
pressure regulation step 1 A B,C,D -
pressure regulation step 2 A B,C,D -
pressure regulation step 3 A,B C,D -
pressure regulation step 4 A,B,C,D - -
Table 1
Service level of each load node after each step of the failure management procedure, that changes either
the network topology or the pressure at the supply node, after a failure of pipe 5.
3.5 Conclusions
The approach of [11] supports modelling and evaluation of the transient behaviour
of a gas distribution network after a pipe failure. As a salient feature, the approach
allows the use of non-Markovian transitions that overcome the limits of previous
modelling approaches. This section only shows a small example, however, larger
cases have been addressed in [32,12]. Future work includes relaxing the assump-
tion that recovery actions do not overlap with variations of the network operating
conditions.
4 Smart Grid infrastructure
4.1 Smart Grid
The Smart Grid vision for the generation and distribution of electric power is sus-
tained by favourable tradeoﬀ between the ratio of the increasing power generation,
transmission and distribution costs to the decreasing costs of deploying computer
and communication technologies. Therefore, utilities are embarking onto capital in-
vestments that deploy computer and communication technologies to the power grid
with the objective of increasing the overall reliability of power systems. One ob-
jective of these investments is fortiﬁcation of the grid against inevitable disruptions
caused by weather, as, for instance, exempliﬁed by the very large storm (Sandy)
that recently hit the northeast coast of the United States. Regardless of the source
of disruptions, which could also be the result of attacks, the goal is to mitigate the
eﬀects of failure and prevent cascading blackouts.
Smart grids aim to deploy proven ICT and internet services to the power system.
For example, one approach to power reliability improvement is to dynamically route
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Fig. 3. The UML activity diagram of failure management actions (upper) and the corresponding sTPN
speciﬁcation (lower). In the sTPN, distributions associated with timed transitions refer to the example
discussed in 3.4 (immediate, exponential, and general transitions are represented by thin bars, thick empty
bars, and thick black bars, respectively).
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Fig. 4. (a) The example gas distribution network; (b) probability that nodes A, B, C, and D are not served
after a failure of pipe 5; (c) CDF of the time during which nodes C and D are not served; (d) completion
time distribution of the failure management process. All times are expressed in hours.
power. This is equivalent to dynamic routing protocols in the internet that detect
failed links and automatically re-route over them. This is referred to in smart
grid terminology as failure detection, isolation and restoration (FDIR), whereby
faulty sections of a feeder line are located and isolated, and power is restored to
sections outside the faulty region. Dynamic routing protocols in the Internet are
complemented by dynamic ﬂow control algorithms. In power systems, ﬂow control
is referred to as demand/response. The demand/response feature in power systems
are activated to manage transient variations in the supply-demand power balance
or as a failure recovery mechanism.
Therefore, the opportunity for improvement of the reliability of power systems
by the deployment of computer and communication technologies has been a topic
of interest to system dependability researchers, see, e.g., [10,20,60,47,21,42]. The
survivability assessment of power grids was ﬁrst performed in [8,35,46].
4.2 Modelling approaches
Most existing approaches focus on steady-state analysis of power distribution sys-
tems. For example, Brown et al. [10] use an hierarchical Markovian model to
derive classical metrics such as the system average interruption duration index
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Fig. 5. Failed section (i = 5; blue) and its upstream sections (i+; green) and downstream (i−; red)
(from [8]).
(SAIDI). Pievatolo et al. [50] presents a model where the components fail according
to independent semi-Markov processes and the restoration times can follow non-
exponential distributions. Using the model, the authors obtain the steady-state
outage duration distribution. Elmakias [20] reviews available applications of Markov
models in power system reliability assessment, focused on steady-state metrics.
Several studies [60,64,58,62] study the impact of adding Distributed Generation
(DG) as a backup source in a power system on reliability metrics such as SAIDI.
Martins and Borges [44] present a model for active distribution systems expansion
planning and assess expansion alternatives using steady state metrics such as SAIDI.
Chopade and Bikdash use graph-theoretic techniques to carry out structural and
functional vulnerability analysis for a smart grid [13]. This study indirectly ad-
dresses survivability through the analysis of vulnerability. On the communication
technology side, Wang et al. [59] evaluate the reliability of wide-area measurement
systems (as part of the monitoring infrastructure of the smart grid) using Marko-
vian models. However, none of these approaches considers transient measures for
survivability. Resilience, deﬁned as the ability of a system to bounce back from a
failure, is a quantitative metric related to survivability. Decision support for phased
recovery of a power grid, based on an analysis of the resilience of the grid throughout
restoration eﬀorts, has been presented in [6].
4.3 A phased-recovery model
Our recently introduced approach [8,46] targets assessment of transient properties
of the power systems accounting for the implications of electro-mechanical and
computer-based strategies to address failures in an integrated manner. In this
approach, we quantify the eﬀect of FDIR behaviour and demand/response func-
tionality on survivability metrics, based on extended SAIDI metrics. We assume
a topology as shown in Figure 5, where a feeder line between two substations is
partitioned into sections that can be isolated by opening recloser devices. In case
of a failure, parts of the feeder line can be powered by the backup substation by
opening the tie switch.
The assessment of complex systems such as the smart grid with numerous ele-
ments and many possible states is highly challenging. The key steps to make our
analysis feasible have been: (i) initial state conditioning: considering survivability
instead of overall reliability metrics, thus conditioning the initial state of our model
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Fig. 6. Phased recovery model (adapted from [8])
to be a failure state, i.e., the use of GOOD models; (ii) state space factorisation:
modelling the system behaviour after the failure of a single given section; and (iii)
state aggregation: aggregating the state of the sections outside the faulty section.
Figure 5 visualises the state aggregation principle. Consider a failure in section
i = 5. Then, sections 1 to 4 are treated together as the downstream sections (denoted
as i−) and sections 6 to 9 are considered together as the upstream sections (denoted
as i+).
Our approach models the recovery of the system as a Markov chain with reward
rates as illustrated in Figure 6. The states of the model correspond to the diﬀerent
recovery phases, indicated in the upper part of the ﬁgure: failure at section i (blue),
isolation of section i and automated restoration of downstream sections i− (black),
automated restoration of upstream sections i+, and full repair. Each state has a
reward rate, which models the survivability metric of interest. In the following, we
use energy not supplied per hour as reward rate.
Parameters of our model are p, the probability that the communication network
is still operational after a section failure; q, the probability that there is suﬃcient
backup power to supply energy for sections i+; and r, the probability that load
can be successfully reduced in case of insuﬃcient backup power. The time-related
parameters in our model are α, the time to restore the upstream sections, β, the
time to call for demand/response; δ, the time to manually repair the faulty section,
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state 0 – 1 2 3 – 4 5 6
ENS/h 542.27 509.94 542.27 49.50 0.00
Table 2
Choice of reward rates: lower bound on energy not supplied per hour (ENS/h) (from [46]).
and γ, the time to restore communication.
Finally, we denote with  the mean time to detect the failure and isolate the
faulty section. Because  is an order of magnitude smaller than the other intervals
of time considered in this paper, we assume its value to be  = 0. The average time
spend in state 0 (cf. Figure 6) is therefore also 0; the initial probabilities for states
1,3 and 4 are then equal to pq, p(1− q) and 1− p, respectively.
A ﬁnal assumption in our model is that the failure of communication and the
load in the sections are independent of the failed section. Additionally, the model
presented here supports a single faulty section only. In ongoing work [46], we are
extending this to multiple failures.
4.4 Case study
In the following, we show a typical case study of applying our method taken from
[46]. The load per section in the topology (cf. Figure 5, based on a feeder line
in Virginia, USA [60]) is input to compute the values of the reward rates at the
diﬀerent model states, as shown in Table 2. The reward rates are computed based
on data provided by the engineers of the power grid about its topology, taking
into account the load and supply at each section. As the worst-case scenario, we
consider a situation in which section 1 fails, i.e., i = 1, thereby maximising the
demand placed on the backup substation to supply the i+ sections.
Figure 7 (cf. [8]) shows the expected accumulated energy not supplied (EAENS)
by time t, for two cases, namely the case when demand-response is not enabled (left
graphs; r = 0) and demand-response being enabled (right graph; r = 1). Using our
method, changes in diﬀerent parts of the system, i.e., due to investments, can be
assessed. In the following, we analyse the relation between q and r, as an example.
If q = 0.9, that is, there is a high probability that the backup power suﬃces for
sections i+, demand response does not have a signiﬁcant impact on EAENS. In
contrast, if q = 0.1, demand response does play a key role, because sections i+ can
be automatically restored when demand response is eﬀective. The corresponding
plots in Figure 7 (left and right) also demonstrate the signiﬁcant impact of integrated
demand response on EAENS.
The presented method allows us to quantify how various input parameters aﬀect
the EAENS. In other work, cf. [36,35], we show how these input parameters can be
derived for existing power grids and how investments can be optimised. We have
also applied the approach to a distribution automation benchmark derived from a
German medium voltage distribution network [35].
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Fig. 7. Expected accumulated energy not supplied until time t, computed using uniformisation (from [8]).
4.5 Conclusions
The presented method supports the evaluation of diﬀerent investment alternatives
to improve survivability in distribution automation power grids.
The results obtained in the case study indicate that the integration of demand
response with failure recovery results in a signiﬁcant reduction in the amount of
energy not supplied after a failure. In the future our models can serve to quantify
the trade-oﬀs between investment cost and reliability gains. The presented method
is a step towards an holistic approach to guide investment decisions on diﬀerent
parts of a smart grid infrastructure.
5 Summary and future work
In this paper we provide an overview of three approaches towards the modelling
and analysis of the survivability of smart infrastructures, in particular, gas, water
and electricity networks. As more and more citizens rely on such infrastructures,
adequate means to address such infrastructures, in an eﬃcient model-based way,
become more important. Such means help to make important design trade-oﬀs and
to see whether and where investments are needed to guarantee continuous operation.
From a modelling and analysis perspective, the challenges to tackle lie in:
• handling of discrete and continuous quantities, next to deterministic and random
behaviour;
• dealing with large-scale systems, that is, the ability to deal with large models,
large state spaces, and still provide computationally attractive numerical proce-
dures;
• bridging the gap between the viewpoint of an application-engineer (who focusses
on the application, that is, the gas, water or electricity network), and that of the
modeller and analyser of the models.
The three presented approaches have quite a lot in common, however, also have re-
markable diﬀerences. The approaches for smart gas and electricity infrastructures
are based on a form of behavioural decomposition [56] in which the failure (or dis-
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aster) handling process is modelled separately from the performance of the system,
much the same as done in performability evaluation using Markov-reward models
[28]. In contrast, in the approach taken for the water system is truly hybrid, in that
the failure handling process and the water transportation and storage are combined
in a single integrated model. This fully integrated approach has the advantage of
avoiding the approximation due to the behavioural decomposition, however, this
comes at the price of a more limited use of stochastic variables (only one general
stochastic event can be modelled).
In this paper we have only shown small-scale applications of the three recently
developed methods for survivability evaluation. A practical challenge is to team up
with true application engineers, that is, from gas, water and electricity operators,
to come to models for real systems. The ﬁnal proof of the pudding is in the eating!
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